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1 Introduction
The dot.com bubble burst two months after the 2000 AOL TimeWarner merger agreement, causing a
reduction of more than $100 billion in the market value of the merged firm. This dramatic price decline
has made the AOL TimeWarner merger a poster child for the theoretical notion that opportunistic bidder
firms may succeed in selling overpriced shares to target shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004).1 The empirical relevance of such bidder opportunism in M&A activity
is central to the debate over the efficiency of the market for corporate control. The larger concern is
that the most overvalued rather than the most efficient bidder may be winning the target—potentially
distorting the disciplinary role of the takeover market.
We develop and test a classical alternative to bidder opportunism, which we label “rational payment
design”, and which gives rise to interesting new evidence of relevance for this debate. Notice at the outset
that the extant literature tends to make indirect inferences about bidder opportunism through the prism
of the relative market-to-book ratio (M/B) of the bidder and target firms (Harford, 2005; Rhodes-Kropf,
Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh, 2006). While we innovate
and improve on this type of analysis as well, our main test design is different. Our most powerful inferences
about the empirical validity of bidder opportunism versus rational payment design are based not on the
role of M/B or another proxy for market pricing errors, but more fundamentally on how well the target
knows how to value the bidder after completed merger negotiations.
In merger negotiations, non-disclosure and non-compete agreements backed up by state-law protection
of trade secrets pave the way for a mutually beneficial exchange of proprietary information. If successful,
this process may unravel much of the initial information asymmetry between the two parties, including
that reflected in relative market value and M/B at the start of the negotiations. Indeed, Fu, Lin, and
Officer (2013) show that high ratios of bidder to target M/B prior to the price discovery process typically
do not translate into favorable deal terms for acquirers. Rather, bidders with greater M/B relative to
the target ex ante tend to end up paying higher takeover premiums (less favorable exchange ratios) than
what is implied by an extrapolation of the pre-bargaining M/B values. It is as if targets reverse-engineer
initial market mispricing of the bidder shares, if any.
1“[T]he central feature of this acquisition is not technological synergies, but rather the attempt by the management of the
overvalued AOL to buy the hard assets of Time Warner to avoid even worse returns in the long run” (Shleifer and Vishny,
2003, p.295).
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Under our rational payment design hypothesis, bidders that choose to pay for the target with stock are
not opportunistic but instead concerned with adverse selection on the target side of the deal. Intuitively,
while payment in cash commits the bidder to a certain target value ex ante, the value of a stock payment
effectively varies with the subsequent target value realization. This attractive feature of a stock payment
creates a rational incentive for bidders to prefer payment in stock over cash.2 The fraction of stock in
the deal payment is scaled back only if the target undervalues the bidder, which is less likely the more
the target knows about the bidder. In sum, under our rational payment design hypothesis, the better
the target’s skill in valuing the bidder, the higher should be the stock portion of the method of payment.
The prediction is the exact opposite under bidder opportunism. Because better informed targets are
more likely to detect bidder overvaluation, selling overpriced shares is more difficult, and so the stock
portion should be lower with better informed targets. Since the two opposite predictions are nested
within the same initial (pre-negotiation) information structure, a given set of proxies for the information
structure (that is, for how informed the target is about the bidder) can be used to discriminate between
the two hypotheses. Overall, the rational payment design hypothesis is also an important reminder
that rational bidders may have a strong preference for paying in stock irrespective of the M/B value
or derivative measures of “valuation errors” (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005; Dong,
Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh, 2006).
We use several empirical proxies for the amount of bidder-specific valuation information that is avail-
able to the target. An important feature common to these information proxies is that they are specific
to the bidder-target combination. The perhaps most straightforward proxy is the degree of industry
complementarity—the degree to which the target and bidder input and output industries overlap (Fan
and Lang, 2000). While such industry relatedness may also affect relative bargaining power (Ahern,
2012), our key test requires only that it is easier for the target to value a bidder that operate in similar
product/labor markets and with a related production technology.
Another interesting information proxy is the geographical proximity of the two firms. While ours is
the first paper to use location to study the form of payment method, there is a growing empirical literature
suggesting that geographic location is economically relevant for a wide variety of reasons, ranging from
market pricing (Garcia and Norli, 2012) to acquisition activity and investment (Kedia, Panchapagesan,
2For equilibrium models of the payment method choice that incorporate this and other features of a rational payment
method choice, see e.g., Hansen (1985), Fishman (1989), Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel (1990), and DeMarzo, Kremer,
and Skrzypacz (2005).
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and Uysal, 2008; Almazan, de Motto, Titman, and Uysal, 2010). Local sources of information, both
physical and financial, may improve target insights about bidder fundamentals and therefore impact the
payment method choice.
With a sample of 6,200 US public bidders, 1980-2014, the first important finding of this paper is that
the fraction of stock in the deal payment is significantly higher when our information proxies indicate
that the target knows more about bidder pricing. While consistent with the rational payment design
hypothesis, the result is the opposite to that predicted by bidder opportunism. Importantly, this test
does not depend on an explicit model for bidder mispricing (M/B or otherwise) as it simply works
with the fundamental information asymmetry about bidder valuation that exists under either of the two
competing hypotheses.
In addition, we provide a model-based test of the role of potential bidder mispricing for the use of
stock. Here, we start with the finding that the likelihood of a stock-bid is increasing in bidder M/B.
One interpretation of this evidence is that high-growth (high M/B) acquirers tend to be cash constrained
beyond what is explicitly captured by the control factors included in the analysis (Harford, 2005). An-
other interpretation is that M/B is positively correlated with unobservable market pricing errors and
that opportunistic bidders are successful in exploiting this mispricing despite the price discovery process
afforded by merger negotiations (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005; Dong, Hirshleifer,
Richardson, and Teoh, 2006).
In order to discriminate between these two alternative interpretations, we start with the assumption
that exogenous variation in bidder M/B may be correlated with variation in bidder mispricing, without
otherwise affecting the bidder’s choice of payment method. We identify this exogenous variation using
large aggregate outflows from mutual funds holding stock in our sample bidders. Large fund outflows
have been shown to significantly decrease stock prices (Coval and Stafford, 2007) and increase takeover
probability (Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2012). To the extent that this exogenous price pressure lowers
bidder M/B, it also reduces bidder pricing error and thus the scope for bidder opportunism. Hence, under
our bidder opportunism hypothesis, this price pressure should cause a reduction in the use of stock in the
deal payment. The second important finding of this paper is that the use of stock in the deal is statistically
independent of the bidder price pressure, which fails to support bidder opportunism. This conclusion is
robust to whether we instrument M/B or its firm-specific component, using the decomposition technique
of Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005).
3
In arriving at these two main empirical results, we control for baseline effects of bidder capital structure
and cash balances on the payment method choice, much as suggested by the extant literature.3 The
baseline model shows that the fraction of stock is higher for relatively small, high growth companies
with high R&D spending and few pledgable assets. Also interesting, notwithstanding the widespread
cumulation of cash balances in recent decades, bidder cash holdings are not a determinant of the fraction
of stock in the deal.
When developing the baseline model, we also find that the fraction of stock in the deal is significantly
affected by two hitherto undocumented external sources of pressures on public bidders to pay in cash. The
first source is from what we label “cash-only sellers”: sellers who almost always demand settlement in cash,
including targets that are subsidiaries (Officer, 2007) or owned by a financial sponsor such as a private
equity fund. The second source of external pressure to pay in cash is indirect: potential competition
from relatively illiquid private bidders in the industry of the target. We argue that, as private bidders
within a given target industry compete with public bidders by offering cash, they exert pressure on public
bidders to also do so. We therefore include cash-only sellers and potential private bidder competition in
our baseline model. Interestingly, both these two proxies are consistently found to reduce the fraction of
stock in the deal payment.
Given the paper’s central focus on asymmetric information, we end the empirical analysis with a more
standard analysis of short- and long-run effects on bidder stock returns of the payment method choice. The
bidder opportunism and rational payment design hypotheses both allow for negative announcement effects
due to adverse selection on the bidder side (Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, the latter hypothesis
also implies that the bidder announcement returns should be monotonically decreasing in the fraction of
the deal paid in stock (Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel, 1990). Consistent with earlier work, we find
some evidence consistent with this prediction, but only when the target is publicly traded (Fuller, Netter,
and Stegemoller, 2002). Furthermore, we find no evidence of statistically significant bidder long-run
(36 month) abnormal stock returns following the announcement of all-stock offers, even for high M/B
bidders. This is as expected when the information in the merger announcement largely resolves the initial
information asymmetry between the bidder firm and the market, and it again fails to support the notion
that bidder opportunism is economically and statistically important.
3See, e.g., Martin (1996), Harford (1999), Faccio and Masulis (2005), Morellec and Zhdanov (2008), Harford, Klasa, and
Walcott (2009), Karampatsas, Petmezas, and Travlos (2014).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data selection and show time
trends in the payment method form for our large sample of takeovers. This section also highlights the
significant presence of cash-only sellers and potential competition from private bidders after year 2000.
Section 3 presents our information-based tests of the bidder opportunism versus the rational payment
design hypotheses. Section 4 reports the instrumental variable (IV) test results where we condition on
a proxy for the market’s error in valuing the bidder. Section 5 provides estimates of bidder short- and
long-run stock return performance as a check on the information content of the payment method choice.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Trends in payment methods and external pressures to pay in cash
The sample of this paper consists of 6,200 takeover bids for US targets by US public nonfinancial ac-
quirers, 1980-2014. Bids are identified using the “Merger” transaction form in SDC Platinum Mergers &
Acquisitions. Bidders must also be available on both CRSP and Compustat. Moreover, to be included,
deal size must be a minimum of $10 million and 1% of bidder total book assets, and we require infor-
mation on the bidder capital structure variables in Table 2. The sample includes both successful and
unsuccessful bids. Details of the sample characteristics are discussed in Section 3 below.
2.1 Payment method time trends
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the annual distribution of the 6,200 sample bids and a breakdown by payment
method. The period with the greatest number of bids is 1995-2000, which covers 40% of the total sample.
The unusually high takeover activity by public bidders is followed by a fifty percent drop in the annual
average number of bids, from 314 in the 1990s to 168 in 2001-2014. The downward shift in the number
of takeover bids by public bidders mirrors the 50% drop in the number of publicly listed US companies
from 1996 to 2012 (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2016). As a result, the overall takeover propensity of
public firms has remained relatively unchanged over the sample period.
As reported by Boone, Lie, and Liu (2014) and De Bodt, Cousin, and Roll (2016) as well, Panel B
of Figure 1 shows a dramatic drop in the fraction of all-stock bids after year 2000. The average annual
number of all-stock bids falls by 83%, from 166 in the 1991-2000 period to 28 in 2001-2014, accounting
for 95% of the total reduction in public bidder takeover activity. At the same time, the average annual
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number of all-cash bids increases by one-third (from 63 to 82), while mixed offers declines by one-third
after year 2000 (from 85 to 57). The sample proportion of mixed offers, however, remains relatively stable
over the entire sample period. Moreover, the average fraction of all-stock bids declines from 53% in the
1990s to only 16% after year 2000, while the proportion of all-cash bids increases from 21% to 50%.
In light of the significant reduction in listed firms after year 2000, the shift in payment method likely
reflects a combination of changing firm characteristics and a given public bidder’s propensity to pay with
cash. Boone, Lie, and Liu (2014) argue that the shift is related to changes in asymmetric information and
adverse selection, while De Bodt, Cousin, and Roll (2016) suggest that the 2001-abolishment of pooling
accounting in takeovers may also have contributed to lowering (earnings-based) managerial incentives
to make all-stock bids. The cross-sectional regressions below shed further light on this issue as they
condition the payment method choice more directly on firm characteristics that may distinguish between
rational payment design and bidder opportunism.
2.2 Time trends in external all-cash pressures
While hitherto unexplored in the literature, there exist certain external pressures on public bidders to
pay in cash. We identify two sources of such external pressure, and which we also integrate into the
regression analysis below. The first pressure is from “cash-only” sellers. These are sellers who are likely
to demand cash regardless of the public status of the bidder. Examples of cash-only sellers are private
targets that are portfolio companies of financial sponsors (e.g., private equity funds) and targets that
are subsidiaries. Our labeling of subsidiary-targets as cash-only sellers is supported by the large-sample
evidence in Officer (2007) where as much as 94% of subsidiary targets are paid for in cash.
The second source of external pressure on our public bidders to pay in cash is more suggestive but,
as it turns out, also highly significant: potential competition for the target from cash-paying private
bidders. Due to their own-stock illiquidity, private bidders often have little choice but to pay with cash
when competing with public bidders for the same target. As potential competition from private bidders
intensifies, public bidders may be pushed towards more cash in the payment structure. While we do not
have direct evidence of such a competitive effect, the simple time-series correlation between the percent
private bidders in the overall population of takeover bids and the fraction of all-cash bids by our public
bidders is surprisingly high.
Panel A of Figure 2 plots the time series of % Cash-Only Sellers and % Private Bidders over the
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sample period. To construct these series, we use an expanded sample of N e=18,289 merger bids by US
bidders for US targets, 1980-2014. As before, we sample mergers and require a deal size of at least $10
million and 1% of bidder total assets. N e is the sum of our N=6,200 bids by nonfinancial public bidders,
N1=3,639 bids by financial public bidders, N2=3,325 bids by nonfinancial public bidders with missing
information on the bidder characteristics in Table 2, and N3=5,125 bids by private bidders. Of the private
bidders (N3), 63% are financial institutions or sponsors, and 37% are strategic acquirers.
In panel A, the time series of % Cash-Only Sellers, which is the fraction of targets in N e that are
subsidiary targets or financial-sponsor targets, is high (18%) in the early 1990s, low in the late 1990s,
and high again in the period after year 2000, reaching 24% in 2012. Moreover, % Private Bidders, which
is the value of N3/N
e, averages 28% over the sample period, reaching a high of 56% in 1988, a low of
14% in 1996, and rebounding to 48% in 2011. Interestingly, the time-series correlations between the
fraction of all-cash bids by the public bidders in our sample (repeated for illustrational purpose from
Panel B of Figure 1) and the values of % Cash-Only Sellers and % Private Bidders are substantial. The
former correlation is 0.21, while the latter is an impressive 0.72. If competition from private bidders truly
constitutes an important external pressure on public bidders to pay in cash, then the rise in all-cash
sellers after year 2000 likely helps explain the parallel rise in all-cash deals.
We further investigate this issue in the context of the multivariate regressions below, where we include
target-specific values of Cash-Only Seller and % Private Bidders as determinants of the payment method
choice. Since credit market conditions may fuel both competition from cash-based bidders and cash-use
by the winning public bidder, we also control for year-fixed effects and, alternatively, the credit spread.
As discussed below, both cash-pressure variables remain strongly negatively correlated with the fraction
of stock payment in bids by public bidders also after controlling for year-fixed effects or credit spread. It
seems clear that external all-cash pressures have an important impact on the payment method choice of
public bidders.
3 The stock-payment choice with relatively informed targets
3.1 Sample characteristics
Table 1 lists a complete set of definitions of and sample source for the variables used throughout the
paper. Table 2 shows the mean and median values of central characteristics sorted by payment method.
7
In the total sample, 46% of the targets are publicly listed and the average relative deal size (deal value
divided by acquirer total assets) is 1.0 with a median of 0.28. Moreover, 88% of the sample bids are
successful, classified in SDC as “completed”.
In addition to Size (natural log of total assets), the bidder capital structure variables in Table 2 include
Leverage (book value of total debt), Cash Holding, Asset Tangibility (property plant and equipment), and
R&D, all scaled by total assets. Moreover, capital structure variables include M/B, Dividend Dummy
and Operating Efficiency (defined as cost of goods sold + sales general and administrative expenses)/net
operating assets). The table shows that all-stock acquirers are on average smaller than all-cash acquirers,
and they have higher cash holdings, M/B and R&D expenses, and lower leverage and asset tangibility.
Also, the fraction of dividend payers is 0.31 for all-stock bidders and 0.48 for all-cash bidders.
Among the industry and time period characteristics in Table 2, Industry Wave is constructed as in
Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang (2013). Specifically, for each FF49 industry and year, we calculate the
aggregate dollar volume of mergers scaled by the total assets of all Compustat firms in the industry.
Industry Wave is the annual value of industry mergers-to-total assets, normalized by its time-series
mean and standard deviation over the sample period. On average, all-stock bids have significantly higher
values of Industry Wave than all-cash bids.
Post Bubble is a dummy for the 2001-2014 period, which covers 45% of the sample bids (60% of the
all-cash offers and 28% of the all-stock bids). The variable High-Tech is a dummy that takes on a value
of one if the bidder is in what the American Electronic Association identifies as a high-tech industry
(comprising 47 four-digit SIC codes in the two-digit industries 28, 35, 36, 38, 48, and 73). In our sample,
43% of the bidders are high-tech, accounting for 54% of the all-stock offers and 36% of the all-cash bids.
Table 3 shows the distribution of the sample across the acquirer’s FF49 industries. Of the sample
bids, 37% are paid in all-stock, 33% in all-cash, and 30% in a mix of cash and stock, in which the average
fraction of stock is 57%. Two-thirds of the bids take place in the ten most active FF49 industries, with a
minimum of 218 bids over the sample period. Of these ten industries, the three with the highest fraction
of all-stock offers are Computers (54%), Computer Software (49%) and Electronic Equipment (47%).
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3.2 Preliminaries: baseline choice model estimation
Our main inferences concerning the validity of bidder opportunism condition on a baseline cross-sectional
model for the fraction of stock in the deal payment, Stock ∈ [0, 1], estimated using Tobit.4 This model
is shown in Table 4. We are primarily interested in the choice of Stock because bidder opportunism may
exist across the spectrum of mixed cash-stock deals. However, we show in Table 5 that key baseline-
model coefficient estimates are similar also when using a multinomial probit estimation, where the choice
is between all-stock and mixed offers with all-cash as the base outcome.
As detailed below, the baseline choice model contains four groups of determinants: (1) Capital struc-
ture, referring to internal capital structure considerations, (2) External pressure to pay in cash, referring
to the cash-only sellers and competition from private bidders discussed above, (3) Deal characteristics,
including relative deal size and whether the target is public, and (4) Industry/time characteristics, in-
cluding industry wave, high-tech industry, and post-bubble period. In addition, most of the regression
models include bidder industry dummies based on the FF49 industry definitions.
3.2.1 Capital structure characteristics
The extant literature suggests that financing large investments such as mergers and acquisitions may
trigger post-merger leverage adjustments (Harford, Klasa, and Walcott, 2009) and, of primary concern
here, a deliberate payment method choice reflecting capital structure considerations (Faccio and Masulis,
2005; Uysal, 2011; Karampatsas, Petmezas, and Travlos, 2014). As buyers assume or refinance the target’s
outstanding debt, the payment method directly affects the combined firm’s leverage ratio. In our context,
irrespective of the target’s leverage ratio, and unless the cash bid is financed with an equity issue, the
post-takeover leverage of the combined firm is always lower for a stock bid than for a cash bid.
The baseline model estimation includes eight capital structure characteristics. In the Tobit estima-
tion in tables 4 and 6, Size (log of total assets), M/B, R&D and Asset Tangibility are all reliably
significant across all specifications, with stock-financing increasing in M/B and R&D and decreasing in
Asset Tangibility and Size.5 Table 5 further shows that the positive effect of M/B is restricted to the
choice between all-stock and all-cash, with a statistically insignificant coefficient for mixed offers. Also in
4While we observe the full range of Stock itself, Stock is a bounded representation of the underlying function driving the
true payment method choice, thus the Tobit estimation (Maddala, 1983).
5The reduction in sample size from 6,200 to 5,841 in Table 4 is caused by missing data on the exact fraction stock in the
total deal payment.
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Table 5, Asset Tangibility is not significant for mixed offers after adding industry-fixed effects. Overall,
as reported by extant studies as well, the fraction stock in the deal tends to be higher for relatively small,
growth firms with high R&D and low asset tangibility.
Perhaps surprising, Leverage and Cash Holding have a largely insignificant impact on the fraction
stock in Table 4 and on the probability of an all-stock offer in Table 5. To examine this finding further,
we add two pieces of information. First, Panel B of Figure 2 plots the average cash balances for the
sample bidders and the population of Compustat firms. It shows that bidder average cash holdings rise
to about 18% already in year 1990 and remain approximately at that level until 2014. Thus, high bidder
cash balances are indeed an unlikely explanation for the dramatic increase in all-cash bids after year 2000
shown earlier in Panel B of Figure 1.
Second, in Table 6, we decompose Leverage (Cash Holding) into Target Leverage (Target Cash Hold-
ing) and the deviation from the target leverage (deviation from target cash holding). This is done using
the fitted values of the following two (OLS) regressions across the universe of industrial Compustat firms
in a given acquisition year t:
Leveraget = f(Xt−1) + et, (1)
Cash Holdingt = f(Xt−1, Leveraget−1) + gt, (2)
where the vector Xt−1 of lagged firm characteristics lagged contains Size, Operating Efficiency, M/B,
R&D, Missing R&D, Asset tangibility, and a dummy for the acquirer’s FF49 industry. Missing R&D
is a dummy indicating a missing Compustat value. The variables Deviation from Target Leverage and
Deviation from Target Cash are the fitted residuals from these two regressions. The table shows results
using either book or market leverage ratios.
The first three columns of Table 6 report coefficient estimates using market leverage, while the last
three columns are based on book leverage ratios. With book leverage, Target Leverage and Deviation
from Target Leverage are both insignificant (columns 4-6). However, when using market leverage, greater
Target Leverage lowers the fraction of stock in the deal payment, while greater Deviation from Target
Leverage increases the fraction stock in all specifications (columns 1-3). This suggests that acquirers with
relatively high target market leverage ratios tend to use more cash as deal payment. Moreover, consistent
with the evidence in Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009), “overleveraged” acquirers tend to increase the
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use of stock, which reduces excess leverage.
Turning to the cash-balance decomposition, greater Target Cash Holding is associated with signifi-
cantly lower fraction of stock in the deal payment, while Deviation from Target Cash has no impact on the
payment method choice. This suggests that firms holding large target cash balances relative to total eq-
uity tend to have a preference for paying for the target in cash. This conclusion differs from in Pinkowitz,
Sturgess, and Williamson (2013) who find that that being relatively “cash rich” tends to increase the
likelihood that the deal is paid in stock. Note, however, that Pinkowitz, Sturgess, and Williamson (2013)
include small asset acquisitions along with merger transactions, which results in a much greater sample
proportion of all-cash offers than in our sample (60% versus 33% in this paper).
Finally, Table 6 demonstrates that, although the use of market leverage leads to a significant coefficient
for Deviation from Target Leverage when book leverage does not, the choice of market versus book
leverage has no discernable impact on the remaining regression coefficients in the baseline model. In the
following, we use book leverage when conditioning the bidder opportunism hypothesis on capital structure
characteristics. We use book leverage because the IV tests in Section 4 below rely on a single instrument
to identify exogenous variation in bidder M/B and so are restricted to one endogenous variable driven
by market value. The results in Table 6, however, suggests that our choice of book- over market leverage
should have only minimal impact on the ensuing test results.
3.2.2 External pressure to pay in cash
The characteristics categorized as External pressure to pay in cash include two variables: Competition
from Private Buyers and Cash-only Seller. The former variable is defined as % Private Bidders in Section
2.2 above, but now calculated for the target’s FF49 industry and year. The latter is a binary variable
with a value of one if the target is a subsidiary target or a financial-sponsor target and zero otherwise.
Competition from Private Buyers receives an economically and statistically significant negative coeffi-
cient in all regression specifications throughout the paper. While we interpret this as evidence of external
pressure on public bidders to pay in cash, it is also possible that credit market conditions fuel both com-
petition from cash-based private bidders and cash-use by the winning public bidder. Notice, however,
that Competition from Private Buyers receives a large and highly significant coefficient also in Column
(4) of Table 4, which controls for the credit-market spread, and in Column (5), which includes year-fixed
effects. Thus, within-year variation in Competition from Private Buyers is strongly negatively associated
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with public bidder’s propensity to pay for the target in stock, which further supports our interpretation
of this variable.
Like Competition from Private Buyers, the dummy variable Cash-only Seller also receives a negative
and significant coefficient in all Tobit regressions in tables 4 and 6. Moreover, as expected, Cash-only
Seller is statistically insignificant for the conditional probability of a mixed offer in the multinomial probit
estimation in Table 5. This evidence supports our conjecture that Cash-only Seller indeed captures a
demand for all-cash payment, which may severely restrict the public bidder’s choice of alternative payment
methods.
3.2.3 Deal-, industry- and time characteristics
The Deal characteristics and Industry/time period characteristics are also significant. These include
dummies for Large Relative Deal Size (indicating that the ratio of deal value to bidder total assets is in
the top quartile) and Public Target. Large Relative Deal Size receives a highly significant and positive
coefficient in all regressions in tables 4 and 5, while the impact of Public target is insignificant. However,
in Table 5, Public Target is significant for mixed offers, reducing the conditional probability of a mixed
payment.
As expected from Panel B of Figure 1, the Tobit regression in Table 4 and the multinomial probit
estimation in Table 5 show that the fraction of stock is significantly lower in the post-bubble period
and it is higher for high-tech bidders. Another interesting result is that Stock is higher for bids taking
place during industry merger waves—although this effect disappears when adding year dummies. Finally,
columns (6) and (7) of Table 4 show that all explanatory variables generate qualitatively similar coefficient
estimates for high-tech and non-high-tech bidders. Thus, we drop this split going forward.
We next turn to tests of the bidder opportunism versus the rational payment design hypotheses using
the baseline variables in Column (3) of Table 4 as controls. We begin the tests by adding proxies for the
target’s information about bidder value, and continue in Section 4 with a model for bidder mispricing
based on an instrumentation of M/B.
3.3 The effect of greater target information about the bidder
Below, we first motivate the intuition behind our rational payment design hypothesis and then proceed
to discuss the empirical test results.
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3.3.1 Adverse selection and bidder incentive to pay in stock
Under the bidder opportunism hypothesis, stock-payments occur when bidder shares are overvalued by
the target (adverse selection on the bidder side). The associated cross-sectional prediction—that it is
more difficult to pay with overpriced shares the better the target’s skill in valuing the bidder—is intuitive
and needs no further motivation. On the other hand, rational payment design, which focuses on the
effects of target adverse selection on the bidder’s payment method choice, is much less discussed in the
debate over bidder opportunism. We therefore add motivation for this hypothesis below.
Suppose two rational and risk-neutral firms have completed merger negotiations without deciding on
the choice of payment method. The merger generates synergy gains which, for notational simplicity, we
assume are bidder specific. Let b denote the with-synergy value of the bidder and t the reservation value
of the target. The two firms know their own values b and t but only the probability distribution over
the counter-party’s value (two-sided information asymmetry). Moreover, during merger negotiations, the
target reveals its estimate bˆ of b to the bidder. The bidder makes the following mixed cash-stock offer
that is acceptable to a target with reservation value of t∗ or less: c + z(bˆ + t∗ − c) = t∗, where c is the
cash amount and z is the fraction of the equity in the merged firm.
Since the offer is accepted by all targets with a reservation price t ≤ t∗ (adverse selection on the
target side), the bidder expects to overpay by an amount equal to t∗ − E[t|a], financed by the synergies
and where a indicates target acceptance. The conditional expected value of the bidder’s residual claim
on the merged firm is therefore
E[v|a] = (1− z)(b+ E[t|a]− c) = bˆ
bˆ+ t∗ − c(b+ E[t|a]− c). (3)
The partial derivative of E[v|a] with respect to c is:
∂E[v|a]
∂c
=
bˆ
(bˆ+ t∗ − c)2
[
(b− bˆ)− (t∗ − E[t|a])
]
. (4)
Note that ∂E[v|a]/∂c < 0 if t∗ − E[t|a] > b − bˆ. In other words, cash is a relatively costly method of
payment when the expected overpayment cost exceeds the target’s undervaluation of the bidder. As long
as this inequality holds, the bidder prefers an all-stock offer. Intuitively, stock conditions the value of
the deal payment on the realized value of the target type ex post, while cash precommits the bidder to a
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payment worth t∗ for all target types.
Absent any response by the target to the bidder’s choice of payment method, Eq. (3) implies either
an all-stock offer (when ∂E[v|a]/∂c < 0) or an all-cash offer (when ∂E[v|a]/∂c > 0). However, precisely
because cash may be a relatively costly form of payment, including cash in the deal payment may also
reveal to the target that it undervalues the bidder shares. The equilibrium choice of (z, c) must therefore
take into account the target’s reaction to this information.
Let c∗ = c/t∗ ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of the payment in cash. Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel
(1990) prove the existence of a (Bayesian) separating equilibrium, where the the signaling game is similar
to the setup above. Since cash is a relatively costly payment method (recall the expected overpayment
cost of t∗ −E[t|a]), the bidder offers the lowest c∗ required to reveal its value to the target. Our rational
payment design hypothesis extends this theoretical result to bids in which targets differ in terms of their
skill in valuing the bidder. Greater skill means a less diffuse prior distribution over possible bidder values
and a smaller absolute valuation error |b − bˆ|, which lowers the minimum c∗ required to signal b. Thus,
the more informed the target is about the bidder, the greater the fraction of stock (and deal terms are
fair to both parties in equilibrium).
In sum, the bidder opportunism and rational payment design hypotheses have opposite predictions.
Under opportunism, a given stock payment is interpreted as driven by target overvaluation of the bidder
shares with no correction by the target. Thus, greater target skill in valuating the bidder forces a reduction
in the use of stock in the deal payment. Under rational payment design, the stock payment is driven
by bidder concerns with target adverse selection. Thus, greater target skill increases the use of stock as
payment. In the tests below, we quantify the target’s skill in valuing the bidder using several empirical
proxies, while we employ the above empirical baseline model to control for determinants of the payment
method choice not related to issues of adverse selection.
3.3.2 Empirical test results
Our empirical proxies for the quality of the target’s information about bidder pricing are as follows:
(1) Industry Complementarity—the degree to which the target and bidder input and output industries
overlap.
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This measure is based on the Input-Output industry matrix of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). Fan and Lang (2000) compute, for each BEA industry i, the percentage bik (vki) of its output
(input) supplied to (purchased from) each intermediate BEA industry k. For each pair of industries i
and j, they then calculate the simple correlation coefficient between bik and bjk (vki and vkj) across all
k except i and j. We map the 4-digit SIC codes of the targets and bidders into the BEA industries
and, for each target-bidder pair, calculate the average input and output correlation as our measure of
complementarity. The measure averages 71% with a median of 86% (Table 2).
(2) Geographic proximity and location—the physical closeness and location of the two firms.
We use two dummy variables: Local deal indicates that the acquirer and target are located within 30
miles from each other. Urban deal indicates that the acquirer firm is located within 30 miles from the
center of one of the ten largest metropolitan areas. These two variables are constructed using zip codes
from SDC to calculate latitude (lat) and longitude (long) coordinates for each firm, based on the 1987
U.S. Census Gazetteer Files.6 Following Cai, Tian, and Xia (2016), we compute the distance between
acquirers and targets using the spherical law of cosines.
Our merging firms are on average approximately 1,000 miles (median 600 miles) apart. However, the
distance between the bidder and the target is bimodal. A large number of bidder-target pairs are located
in the same zip code area, while many acquirers and targets are located on opposite sides of the country
(a distance of about 2,500 miles). For Urban Deal, the ten large metropolitan areas are Boston, Chicago,
Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington DC.
As shown in Table 2, 17% of the sample bids have targets located within thirty miles of the acquirer, and
40% of the acquirers are located in, or close to, a large metropolitan area.7
(3) Recent SEO and acquisition activity—capturing the amount of valuation-related information dis-
closed publicly by the bidder prior to the merger negotiations.
Recent SEO is a dummy variable indicating that the bidder did a seasoned equity offering during the
eighteen months preceding the bid (source: SDC Platinum Global New Issues Database).8 Similarly,
6If the zip code is missing, we extract additional information from the firm address. For example, if city information is
available, we use the coordinate of the city center.
7Kedia, Panchapagesan, and Usyal (2008) use a 60-miles cut-off in their study of acquirer returns. Our results are robust
to using their cutoff distance.
8Schlingemann (2004) and Giuli (2013) provide evidence on SEOs preceding acquisitions.
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Recent Acquirer indicates that the bidder announced a merger bid within the same prior eighteen-month
period. Whatever the outcome of these earlier transactions, the information disclosure enhances the
target’s ability to value the bidder shares, increasing the difficulty of selling overpriced shares in the
current merger transaction. For example, the market reaction to the information in the prior SEO may
itself have reduced mispricing of the bidder shares. The Recent SEO dummy may also capture bidder
fundamentals dictating a preference for financing with stock not already explained by our baseline capital
structure controls. The average value of Recent Acquirer is 25%, while Recent SEO averages 26% (Table
2).
Table 7 shows the results of adding the information variables to our Tobit estimation of the fraction
of stock (columns 1 and 2), and to the multinomial probit estimation of the choice between all-cash, all-
stock and mixed offers (columns 3-6). The model controls for the baseline characteristics from Column
(3) of Table 4. Moreover, since Industry Complementarity captures product relatedness, we also control
for another potentially important aspect of product market characteristics: product market competition,
measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). HHI is calculated by total assets of Compustat
firms in the bidder’s FF49 industry. For expositional simplicity, the table suppresses the baseline coeffi-
cients other than the novel External pressure to pay in cash (the remaining baseline coefficient estimates
are available upon request).
Four of the five target information proxies receive statistically significant and positive coefficient
estimates in the two models with Tobit estimation. First, greater values for Industry Complementarity
increase the fraction of stock in the deal as predicted by our rational payment design hypothesis: the
more informed the target is about the bidder through interrelated product markets, the more stock is
used as payment.
Second, the coefficient on Local Deal is positive and highly significant. Thus, close geographic prox-
imity between the two parties increases the use of bidder stock, also as predicted. The significance of
geographic proximity possibly reflects a combination of greater physical plant information possessed by
target managers, from interrelated local labor markets, and perhaps from having directly experienced the
bidder’s actions in the local community. The coefficient on Urban Deal is insignificant, however, possibly
because it is somewhat subsumed in Local Deal. Third, Recent SEO and Recent Acquirer also receive
positive and significant coefficients, suggesting that prior market transactions reducing the uncertainty
about bidder valuation are associated with an increase in the use of stock.
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3.4 Further discussion and robustness checks
The above empirical results suggest that bidder opportunism, if it exists in the data, is of a second
order at best. In Table 8, we examine the robustness of this conclusion to the use of five additional,
industry-related proxies for the amount of information available to the target about bidder pricing. Since
all industry-related proxies are bound to be correlated, we examine each one at a time, while maintaining
the baseline controls throughout. In columns (1)-(5), we use the Tobit-estimation of the fraction of stock,
while columns (6) and (7) report the multinomial probit regressions where, as before, the outcomes are
all-stock, mixed cash-stock, and all cash (the baseline outcome).
In columns (1)-(4), the alternative industry measures are Vertical Relatedness, which is based on Fan
and Lang (2000) and measures how much input/output of the bidder industry is bought from/sold to
the target industry; Same Primary SIC dummy with a value of one if the primary 4-digit SIC industry
is the same for the bidder and the target; and Overlapping Industries/Bidder Industries and Overlapping
Industries/Target Industries, computed as the number of overlapping 4-digit SIC codes between the
bidder and target scaled by the number of bidder (target) 4-digit codes, respectively. In Column (5), the
information variable is Acquirer-Target return Correlation, measured as the daily stock return correlation
between the bidder and target firms over trading days -290 through day -41, where day 0 is the first
public bid announcement. Since this measure requires both firms to be publicly traded, the sample size
is reduced to about one-third of the full sample.
The five alternative measures industry relatedness each receive a statistically significant positive coef-
ficient estimate (at 5% or less). Thus, the positive impact of Industry Complementarity in Table 7 carries
over to these other measures, which perhaps more directly reflect vertical and horizontal trade relation-
ships. In other words, targets that may be more skilled at valuing the bidder due to vertical or horizontal
product market relationships are also more likely to accept deal payment involving bidder stock. The
final correlation measure is also positive and significant, confirming the finding of Boone, Lie, and Liu
(2014) that greater pairwise return correlation tends to increase the probability of stock payment. Since
the information in pairwise return correlations likely captures more than just industry factors (De Bodt,
Eckbo, and Roll, 2016), greater comovements may assist the target in pricing the bidder shares.
The coefficient estimates for our information proxies are unlikely to be driven by target information
alone. For example, Ahern (2012) reports that closer industry relationship between bidders and targets
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tends to enhance bidder bargaining power (measured as the bidder’s share of total takeover synergies).
Increased bargaining does not, however, alter the basic prediction of our bidder opportunism hypothesis.
To see why, suppose that increased industry relatedness increases both bidder bargaining power and the
target’s skill in valuing the bidder shares. Moreover, suppose the bidder uses the incremental bargaining
power to increase the stock portion of the payment. Again, since the target is better informed, the
greater stock portion is less likely to be driven by bidder opportunism and more likely to reflect rational
payment design. In other words, for bidder opportunism to prevail at a meaningful degree in the data,
the marginal effect of the information proxies must again be negative.
Moreover, our analysis omits variables such as institutional cross-ownership and the use of common
advisors, which may also reduce information asymmetry between bidder and targets and perhaps affect
the payment method (Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007; Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2008; Harford, Jenter, and
Li, 2011; Agrawal, Cooper, Lian, and Wang, 2013). Again, since a reduction in information asymmetry
is antithetic to mispricing, the positive coefficient estimates for our information proxies continue to reject
the notion that bidder opportunism is pervasive in the data.
We next turn to our alternative, IV tests of bidder opportunism, in which we instrument bidder
market values with aggregate fund outflows in order to identify exogenous variation in potential market
mispricing of the bidder firms in our sample.
4 The stock-payment choice conditional on a misvaluation model
In Section 3 above, we characterize the positive impact of M/B in our baseline model as evidence that
high growth firms may prefer to pay for targets with stock due to cash constraints. In this section, we
explore the alternative misvaluation interpretation. That is, following Shleifer and Vishny (2003), several
papers suggest that acquirer M/B or related accounting valuation metrics may be used as proxies for
bidder mispricing and opportunistic behavior. For example, Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan
(2005) extract a firm-specific “valuation error” after industry-adjusting M/B, while Dong, Hirshleifer,
Richardson, and Teoh (2006) model potential bidder mispricing relative to a residual income model.
The issue is whether the positive correlation between the fraction stock in the deal payment and M/B
in our baseline model is evidence of bidder opportunism—bidders getting away with selling overpriced
stock when market valuations are high—or latent (omitted) factors in the baseline model reflecting, e.g.,
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future investment opportunities or cash flow uncertainties. We therefore use a two-stage IV approach,
where the first stage constructs an instrument for M/B that identifies exogenous variation in the market’s
pricing of bidder stock (unrelated to the endogenous merger decision). In the second stage, we test whether
the fraction of stock in the deal payment remains an increasing function of the instrumented M/B as
predicted by bidder opportunism.
4.1 Time series of average market-to-book ratios
We begin by a simple description, in Panel A of Figure 3, of the time series of the average M/B for
the population of Compustat firms and for our sample acquirers. It confirms that bidder M/B was
extraordinarily high in 1998-1999, averaging as much as twelve over that period (and sixteen for bidders
in the high-tech industry). Outside of this period, average bidderM/B fluctuates around four, much as the
time-series behavior of M/B for the Compustat population over the entire sample period. Interestingly,
Panel B shows that that target valuations are also high when bidder valuations are high, to the point
where the average ratio of bidder to target M/B remains quite stable (around two) over the entire sample
period—also for the 1998-1999 period.
As surveyed by Eckbo (2014), a number of rational takeover models exploit differences in M/B (or
Tobin’s Q) across bidders and targets in order to explain merger activity. For example, in Gort (1969)
and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002, 2008), “high buys low” in terms of market-to-book ratios: capital
is reallocated from under-performing, low-Q targets to high-Q bidders with superior management skills
and productive resources. While not a test, the aggregate time series in Panel B of Figure 3 is consistent
with that prediction.9
Moreover, the stable ratio of bidder and target M/B evident in Panel B raises an important question:
why would the high bidder market valuations in the late 1990s favor the bidder as Shleifer and Vishny
(2003) seem to suggest (footnote 1 above)? If anything, there is some extant evidence to indicate the
opposite: Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) study mergers in the 1998-1999 period and find
large announcement-induced dollar-losses to bidders. Moreover, Fu, Lin, and Officer (2013) conclude
more broadly that hypothetical bidder benefits from relative stock overvaluation measured prior to the
9Yang (2008) refines this prediction to one where firms with rising productivity buy assets of firms with falling productivity
(“rising buys falling”). Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) and Levis (2011) use the idea that bidders search for targets
with complementary assets. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) predict that merging firms will have similar M/B ratios
(“like buys like”), which receive some empirical support in their empirical analysis.
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merger announcement largely disappear by the date of deal completion. A consistent interpretation of
their evidence is that targets of bidders with exceptionally high M/B successfully “reverse-engineer” this
information during the price-discovery process.
To further examine the impact of bidder M/B on the fraction of stock in the deal payment, we next
turn to our IV tests of the bidder opportunism hypothesis. The central prediction is that exogenous
increases in acquirer M/B make it easier for the bidder to fool the target into accepting deal terms based
on bidder overvaluation.
4.2 Bidder price pressure from mutual fund outflows
Following Coval and Stafford (2007) and Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), we use aggregate large
mutual fund outflows from US equity funds holding bidder stock in our instrumentation of M/B. While
funds are likely to invest their inflows strategically, using whatever underlying information they have
about their portfolio companies, fund redemptions (outflows) occur under time pressure and so limit
fund manager discretion. The more limited the fund manager’s discretion when trading, the less likely
the trade reflects information about our sample mergers and the more useful is the fund flow as an
instrument for bidder stock price pressure.
The negative price pressure caused by aggregate fund outflows is significant.10 Edmans, Goldstein,
and Jiang (2012) exploit this evidence in a study of the likelihood that a Compustat industrial company
becomes a target. We use a measure of price pressure similar to theirs, applied to bidder firms. Specifically,
we instrument bidder M/B using price pressure from large aggregate fund outflows, and examine whether
the exogenous variation in the (instrumented) M/B affects the fraction of the deal paid in stock.
Let Fjt denote the fund flow experienced by fund j in year t. This fund flow is identified using
Thomson Reuters mutual fund holdings and CRSP mutual fund monthly net returns database, 1980-
2014. Fjt is defined as the change in total fund assets (TAj) from t−1 to t net of the realized fund return
Rjt:
Fjt ≡ TAjt − TAj,t−1(1 +Rjt). (5)
As Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), we restrict the analysis to large outflows in order to minimize
information-based fund trades. Thus, we set Fjt to zero for funds where Fjt/TAj,t−1 > −5%.
10“[W]idespread forced selling by distressed mutual funds exerts significant downward price pressure on the individual
stocks sold, well beyond any contemporaneous information effects” (Coval and Stafford, 2007, p.495).
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Define bidder i’s stock price pressure as
Price pressureit ≡
t∑
τ=t−3
∑
j(Fjτsij,τ−1)
V olumeiτ
, (6)
where the merger announcement takes place in year t + 1. V olumeit is the contemporaneous trading
volume, giving greater price pressure for relatively illiquid bidders, and sij,τ−1 is the lagged portfolio
weight of bidder i in fund j. In our context, to satisfy the exclusion restriction for the instrument,
Price pressure should affect the payment method choice only indirectly through its impact on the
bidder stock price. While a direct correlation between the Price pressure and the conditional choice
of stock payment is highly unlikely for an instrument based on fund outflows, Price pressure is further
defined conservatively by using lagged portfolio weights (sij,τ−1). Moreover, we eliminate sector-specific
funds from the sample (using CRSP information on investment objectives).11
Models I and II in Table 9 report coefficient estimates from the IV regressions for the impact of acquirer
misvaluation, measured by bidder M/B, on the percent stock payment. Model II includes dummies for
bidder FF49 industry, while Model I does not. In the first stage estimation (columns 1 and 3), bidder
M/B is regressed on Price pressure and the controls from the baseline model (Column 3 of Table 4)
and with all firm characteristics lagged one year. Two tests for the validity of Price pressure as an
instrument are reported at the bottom of the table. The Wald test statistic, which tests the exogeneity of
the two-equation system, is significant at the 1% level, supporting our decision to control for endogeneity.
The weak instrument test shows F-statistics that are also significant at the 1% level, confirming that
Price pressure is a statistically valid instrument for M/B.12
The second-stage coefficient estimates in columns (2) and (4) show that the instrumented M/B is
statistically unrelated to the fraction of the deal paid in stock. This result, of course, stands in sharp
contrast to the significantly positive impact of the uninstrumented M/B earlier. The IV estimation,
which identifies the exogenous variation in M/B, suggests that the bidder’s choice of stock-financing of
the deal is unrelated to this variation.
11Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012) and Ben-David, Drake, and Roulstone (2015) use, respectively, large fund inflow
and short interest to indicate private information about potential bidder misvaluation. While these measures may also
reflect investors’ information about fundamental factors related to the payment method choice, our instrument is designed
to minimize such information.
12We note that the instrument Price pressure is likely superior to simply using lagged values of M/B to control for
endogeneity. This is because market capitalization of growth opportunities (which include takeover synergies) and market
pricing errors are likely to be persistent. See Roberts and Whited (2012) for a discussion of the use of lagged variables to
control for endogeneity.
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Models III and IV of Table 9 show that the conclusion based on models I and II is robust with respect
to using the firm-specific valuation error developed by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005)
rather than M/B as a measure of acquirer misvaluation. For a given sample acquirer, the variable
Valuation Error is essentially an industry-adjusted valuation measure, M/B − V/B (expressed in logs).
Here, V is the fitted value from a cross-sectional regression in the year of the merger announcement,
where the dependent variable is the market values of the acquirer’s FF16 Compustat industry peers.13
In both Model III and IV, the first-stage regression shows that the instrument is significant (and more
significant than in Model I and II due to the wider range of factors). More importantly, the impact
of the Instrumented Valuation Error in the second stage is statistically insignificant, again rejecting the
hypothesis that the fraction stock in the deal payment is driven by exogenous variation in bidder valuation
ratios.
5 Does the stock-payment choice convey information to the market?
In this section we examine whether the bidder’s use of stock to pay for the target conveys information
to the market. As explained below, evidence on short- and long-run abnormal stock returns following
merger announcements adds to our understanding of the empirical relevance of the bidder opportunism
hypothesis.
5.1 Empirical predictions
We examine three arguments, all of which assume that the bidder knows more than outside investors
(and the target), about the true value of the bidder shares ex ante, against the null of no information
asymmetry. The first uses as an analogy the Myers and Majluf (1984) model describing a seasoned
equity offering for cash. That is, absent uncertainty about the true target value (one-sided information
asymmetry), market concern with bidder adverse selection and overpricing predicts a negative reaction
to the announcement of an all-stock offer.
Second, under our rational payment design hypothesis, bidders are also concerned with target mis-
pricing (two-sided information asymmetry). As indicated in the introduction, this concern creates an
13As in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), the explanatory variables are log book value of assets, leverage,
and ln(NI)D+ and ln(NI)D−, where D+ and D− are binary indicators for the net income (NI) being positive or negative,
respectively. See also Table 1 for variable definitions.
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incentive for the bidder to pay with stock in order to minimize the expected cost of adverse selection on
the target side of the deal. Furthermore, the payment method choice now also depends on the degree of
target undervaluation of the bidder. Intuitively, the more the target undervalues the bidder, the more the
bidder substitutes stock for cash in the total payment, leading to mixed cash-stock offers. As a result,
in equilibrium, the fraction of cash in the deal payment signals bidder undervaluation and so the market
reaction to the mixed offer is predicted to decrease in the fraction of stock (Eckbo, Giammarino, and
Heinkel, 1990).
Third, the bidder opportunism hypothesis itself does not restrict bidder announcement-induced stock
returns: it is consistent with, but not restricted to, a negative market reaction on average. Fundamen-
tally, while the first two predictions assume that the merger announcements fully reveal bidder private
information, bidder opportunism requires that some of the information asymmetry persists beyond the
merger announcement. Moreover, private bidder information about overpricing that survives the merger
negotiation process must be finite-lived in order for the concept of mispricing to be meaningful. Thus,
bidder opportunism predicts that a long-short portfolio strategy—long in all-cash bidders and short in
all-stock bidders—will exhibit positive abnormal stock return as the mispricing is corrected over time. In
the analysis below, we approximate this time lag by a three-year post-announcement period.
5.2 Announcement-induced stock returns
Abnormal returns are estimated using the standard market model:
rit = a+ brmt + eit, (7)
where rit is bidder i’s daily (CRSP) stock return in excess of the risk free (Treasury-bill) rate, and rmt is the
daily excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio. The market model parameters are estimated
over day -291 through day -42 relative to the day of the first bid announcement (day 0) as reported by
SDC, and we use the three-day window [-1, 1] to estimate announcement-period abnormal returns. We
require at least 100 return observations in the model estimation period and return observations in all of
the three days of the event window.
This estimation procedure produces 5,396 merger announcement returns, with a highly significant
average three-day abnormal stock return of 1.0% (p-value < 0.000). Thus, the average takeover in our
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sample of public bidders is value-increasing for the acquirer. Both the magnitude and significance of
this average abnormal announcement return is consistent with large-sample evidence on average bidder
abnormal stock returns elsewhere in the literature (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2008).
Table 10 shows the coefficient estimates in cross-sectional regressions with bidder announcement
returns as a dependent variable. The fraction of stock payment (Stock), Public Target, and M/B are
key variables of interest. From the extant literature, we know that average bidder abnormal returns tend
to be negative when a relatively large, publicly traded bidder announces an all-stock bid for a public target
(Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2008). Building on this finding, columns (3)-(6) of Table 10 control for
the interaction between Stock and Public target. Moreover, the regression model includes the remaining
baseline factors from Table 4 and the odd-numbered columns include industry dummies.
As shown in columns (1) and (2), Stock and Public Target both enter with statistically significant
and negative coefficients. Moreover, as reported by Chang (1998) and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller
(2002) as well, columns (3) to (6) show that the negative impact of Stock is limited to the subsample
of public targets. In other words, the market reaction to merger announcements declines in the fraction
of stock in the deal only when the target is public. While not a test, this evidence is consistent with
our rational payment design hypothesis provided there is greater adverse selection on the target side
when the target is private and therefore more opaque. That is, greater opaqueness increases the expected
overvaluation cost of cash relative to stock and therefore reduces the negative signal embedded in Stock
(Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinkel, 1990)—possibly to the point where Stock becomes insignificant for
private targets.
A negative effect of Stock in the sample of public targets is also consistent with bidder opportunism,
provided the market reaction does not completely eliminate the information asymmetry. Under bidder
opportunism, and assuming that measures of scaled market value such as M/B represent good proxies
for bidder mispricing (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson,
and Teoh, 2006), one would also expect M/B to receive a negative regression coefficient. However, this
is not supported by Table 10 as the market reaction is statistically independent of M/B, whether as a
stand-alone control variable or when interacted with Stock.
Notwithstanding the insignificance of M/B, under bidder opportunism it is possible that the market
fails to correctly adjust for any residual mispricing at the time of the merger announcement. To examine
this possibility, we next turn to a post-announcement, long-run abnormal return analysis.
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5.3 Post-takeover abnormal performance
If bidder shares in stock-financed deals tend to be overpriced, and if the market fails to correct the
pricing error upon the bid announcement, we should observe a subsequent reversal of the bidder stock
price within a “reasonable time period”. While there is no objective definition of such reasonable time
period, it must be short enough for the notion of private information to be economically meaningful. We
follow the convention of using a window of three calendar years. Thus, we form calendar-time portfolios
of bidder firms sorted on M/B and then on payment method. In this experiment, a high (above median)
M/B indicates high potential for overvaluation of bidder shares, and the test is whether all-stock financed
deals under-perform all-cash deals within the sample of high M/B bidders.
Bidders enter the test portfolio in the month following the month of the initial bid announcement and
is held for 36 months or until delisting, whichever comes first. Denote the monthly portfolio return as
rpt, and the portfolio excess return as r
e
pt ≡ rpt − rft, where rft is the one-month Treasury bill rate. Our
measure of abnormal portfolio performance is the constant term α in the following four-factor return-
generating process containing the excess return on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio (remt), the
two Fama-French factors SMBt and HMLt (Fama and French, 1993), and momentum UMDt (Jegadeesh
and Titman, 1993; Carhart, 1997):
rept = α+ β1r
e
mt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + , t = 1, ..., N, (8)
where t is the error term (assumed to be mean zero and orthogonal to the included risk factors) and the
time index t runs from the first merger announcement in the sample (in 1980) to the last (in 2014), a
total of 419 months in the analysis below.
Table 11 reports the portfolio factor loadings (β) and associated performance estimates (α) for equal-
weighted portfolios in Panel A and for value-weighted portfolios in Panel B. The portfolios in columns
(1)-(3) are restricted to bidder firms with above median M/B, while columns (4)-(6) for below-median
M/B bidders. If opportunism drives bidders to use stock, all-stock bids should signal that bidders are
overvalued, and so we expected the estimates of α to be negative and significant over the portfolio holding
period. The evidence in Table 11 fails to support this prediction as the estimates of α are uniformly small
and statistically insignificant, in particular for the “Long Cash Short Stock” portfolios in columns (3)
and (6). Overall, these results again fail to support bidder opportunism.
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6 Conclusion
In merger negotiations, the payment method decision is made close to deal closure, following an extensive
period of information exchange, valuation estimation and bargaining. At that point, several factors
may influence the fraction of bidder stock in the deal payment, ranging from bidder capital structure to
external pressures to pay with cash. The main contribution of this paper is to develop and empirically
test two competing but nested hypotheses for the incremental impact on the payment method choice
of any residual information asymmetry that may still exist between the bidder and target firms when
signing the deal.
The first hypothesis, bidder opportunism, holds that targets tend to accept payment in overvalued
bidder shares. That is, notwithstanding the long price discovery process, targets are unable to unravel
and rationally correct for the likelihood of adverse selection (opportunism) on the bidder side of the
deal, creating an incentive for the bidder to pay in stock. The second hypothesis, rational payment
design, focuses instead on rational bidder concern with adverse selection on the target side. This concern
also creates an incentive to pay for the target in stock (cash is used only if the target undervalues the
bidder). Testing these two fundamentally different motivations for the use of stock as deal payment is
important: with bidder opportunism, the most overvalued rather than the most efficient bidder may win
the competition for the target assets, potentially undermining the allocative efficiency of the market for
corporate control.
Our main test exploits the simple and intuitive notion that, the more the target knows about the
bidder, the more correctly it values the bidder shares. Specifically, the more correctly the target values the
bidder shares, the lower is the predicted fraction of stock in the deal payment under bidder opportunism,
and the higher is this fraction under rational payment design. The fraction stock is lower under bidder
opportunism because the target is more likely to reverse-engineer the bidder pricing error and adjust
the terms of trade to eliminate the putative gain from selling overpriced shares. The fraction is higher
under rational payment design because the benefit of payment in stock over cash is greater with less target
mispricing of the bidder. We also emphasize that, while testing these nested predictions requires empirical
proxies for the target information about the bidder, the test has the advantage of being model-free: it
does not require an explicit model specification of bidder pricing errors.
Our sample consists of 6,200 takeover bids by US public industrial firms, 1980-2014. Our empirical
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proxies for how much the target knows about the bidder capture industry relatedness and geographic
location that is specific to the pairing of the two firms. Other proxies include recent public information
events, such as seasoned equity offerings and acquisitions by the bidder. We find that public bidders
systematically use more stock in the deal payment when the target knows more about the bidder, as
measured by these information proxies. While inconsistent with opportunism constituting an important
motivation for the use of stock to pay for the target, this evidence is as predicted when bidders are
primarily concerned with adverse selection on the target side of the deal. This conclusion is also corrob-
orated by tests for short- and long-run information effects of merger announcements, conditioning on the
fraction of stock in the deal payment.
Furthermore, we provide a more traditional test of bidder opportunism, which exploits the cross-
sectional variation in bidder market pricing in order to identify potential bidder mispricing. However,
we innovate also here by instrumenting bidder market values using large aggregate outflows from mutual
funds. The idea is that the large fund outflows, which are exogenous to the payment method choice,
may influence this choice through the resulting pressure on the bidder’s market value. Specifically, under
bidder opportunism, the fraction of stock in the deal payment is predicted to be lower following an
exogenous drop in the bidder M/B. We find instead that fraction of stock in the payment is statistically
independent of the instrumented M/B.
While the above tests control for capital structure factors, we also discover and control for a surpris-
ingly strong time-series correlation between the fraction of cash in the deal payment and the fraction
of private bidder activity of the total takeover activity in the industry of the target firm. Since private
(illiquid) bidders typically pay in cash, we interpret this correlation—which is strongly manifested also
in our cross-sectional estimation—as indicating external competitive pressures on our public bidders to
also pay in cash. This external pressure may also contribute to the strong time trend in the composition
of the payment method over the sample period in general, and after the stock market crash in year 2000
in particular.
In sum, our empirical analysis suggests that the payment method choice is driven primarily by a
combination of capital structure considerations, by external pressures to pay in cash, and by bidder
concern with adverse selection on the target side of the deal (efficient payment design). While our tests
cannot not rule out the possibility that some bidders succeed in selling overpriced shares in some deals,
the test results do suggest that this possibility is statistically insignificant at the margin.
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In terms of future research on the payment method choice, it is interesting to also add the potential for
deal advisors, share-ownership concentration and governance factors to constrain bidders from attempting
to sell overpriced shares to the target. Presumably, high-quality deal advisors help reduce information
asymmetry, while cross-ownership by institutional owners may affect the incentive to transfer wealth from
the target to the bidder through mispricing. Moreover, a stock-financed takeover creates a potentially
concentrated group of target legacy shareholders in the merged firm. Rightly or wrongly, such shareholders
may charge ex post that they received payment in overpriced bidder shares—possibly affecting bidder
incentives ex ante.
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Figure 1
Number of takeover bids and their distribution across payment methods, 1980-2014
Panel A shows the annual number of bids and their distribution across payment methods (all-stock, all-cash, and mixed
bids). Panel B shows the annual fraction of all-stock, all-cash, and mixed bids. The sample contains 6,200 merger bids for
US targets by US non-financial public bidders, 1980-2014.
A: Annual total number of bids and the distribution across payment methods
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Figure 2
Bidder cash holdings and external pressure to pay with cash, 1980-2014
Panel A shows the annual average percent all-cash bids in N , and the percent private bidders and “cash only” sellers
in an expanded sample of Ne = 18, 289 takeover bids for US targets by US bidders. Ne is the sum of N1=3,639 bids
by financial public bidders, N2=3,325 bids by nonfinancial public bidders with missing bidder characteristics in Table
2, N3=5,125 bids by private bidders, and our N=6,200 nonfinancial public bidders. % Private Bidders is N3/Ne.
% Cash-Only Sellers is the fraction of subsidiary and financial sponsor targets in Ne. Panel B shows the annual av-
erage ratio of cash to total assets for Compustat firms and our sample of N=6,200 US nonfinancial public bidders, 1980-2014.
A: Percent all-cash bids by public bidders, and percent private bidders and cash-only sellers
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
P e
r c
e n
t
% Cash-Only Sellers % Private Bidders % All-Cash by Public Bidders
B: Average ratio of cash to total assets for Compustat firms and our sample of public bidders
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
A v
e r a
g e
 R
a t i
o  o
f  C
a s
h  t
o  T
o t a
l  A
s s e
t s
Bidder firms Compustat Firms
34
Figure 3
Average bidder M/B and ratio of bidder M/B to target M/B, 1980-2014
Panel A plots the annual average ratio of bidder market-to-book (M/B) for the Compustat population and our sample
firms. Panel B plots the annual average ratio of bidder to target M/B and the fraction of deals in which Acquirer M/B >
Target M/B. The sample contains 6,200 merger bids for US targets by US public bidders, 1980-2014.
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Table 1: Variable Definitions
Variable name Source Variable definition
A. Deal characteristics
Stock SDC Fraction of stock in the total deal payment.
All-Stock SDC All-stock payment. Consideration structure = SHARES.
All-Cash SDC All-cash payment. Consideration structure = CASHO.
Mixed Offer SDC Consideration structure = HYBRID or OTHER.
Completed Deal SDC Deal Status = Completed.
Large Relative Deal Size SDC Dummy=1 if the ratio of deal value to bidder Total Assets is in the
sample top quartile.
Public Target SDC Target public status = Public.
B. Bidder capital structure
Size Compustat Natural log of Total Assets.
Leverage Compustat Total Debt/Total Assets.
Cash Holding Compustat Cash/Total Assets.
M/B Compustat Market-to-book equity ratio = (Year-end closing price x number of
shares outstanding)/(Total Assets - Total Liabilities).
Dividend Dummy Compustat Dummy=1 if total dividends > 0.
R&D Compustat R&D Expense/Total Assets.
Asset Tangibility Compustat Properties, Plants and Equipment/Total Assets.
Operating Efficiency Compustat (Cost of Goods Sold + Selling, General and Administrative ex-
pense)/(Properties, Plants and Equipment + Total Current Assets -
Cash - Total Current Liabilities).
Market Leverage Compustat Total Debt/ (Market Value of Equity + Total Debt).
Target Leverage Authors’ Calculation The predicted value from the following cross-sectional (year-by-year)
regression: Leverage = β0 + β1 (Size) + β2 (Operating Efficiency) +
β3 (Market to Book Equity) + β4 (R&D) + β5 (Missing R&D Dummy)
+ β6 Industry Dummies + e. Based on Harford, Klasa, and Walcott
(2009).
Deviation from Target Lever-
age
Authors’ Calculation The fitted residual from the regression for Target Leverage.
Target Cash Holding Authors’ Calculation The predicted value from the following cross-sectional (year-by-year)
regression: Cash Holding = β0 + β1 (Size) + β2 (Operating Effi-
ciency)+ β3 (Market to Book Equity) + β4 (R&D) + β5 (Missing
R&D Dummy) + β6 (Leverage) + β7 Industry Dummies + e.
Deviation from Target Cash Authors’ Calculation The fitted residual from the regression for Target Cash Holding.
C. External pressure to pay in cash
Competition from Private Buy-
ers
SDC Fraction of all merger bids in the target’s FF49 industry and year in
which the bidder is private.
Cash-Only Seller SDC Dummy=1 if the target is owned by a financial sponsor or is a sub-
sidiary.
HHI Authors’ calculation Herfindahl Hirschman Index. HHI =
∑n
j X
2
j /
∑n
j Xj , where Xj is the
Total Assets of firm j, j = 1, 2.., N , and N is the number of Compustat
firms in the bidder’s FF49 industry and year.
D. Industry and time period characteristics
Industry Wave Authors’ calculation As Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang (2013), the z-score of MTA, where
MTA is the aggregate volume of mergers scaled by aggregate Total
Assets of Compustat firms in the bidder’s FF49 industry and year,
normalized by its time-series mean and standard deviation.
High Tech Dummy American Electronic
Association
Dummy=1 if the bidder is in a high-tech industry, comprising 47 four-
digit SIC codes in the two-digit industries 28, 35, 36, 38, 48, and 73.
Post Bubble SDC Dummy=1 if the deal is announced in the period 2001-2014.
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Table 1 continued from previous page
Variable name Source Variable definition
Credit Spread Federal Reserve website Moody’s yield on AAA seasoned corporate bonds - 3-month treasury
bill (secondary market rate).
FF49 Ken French’s website The 49 industry classifications in Fama and French (1997).
E: Target’s information about bidder value
Industry Complementarity Joseph Fan website Based on Fan and Lang (2000), this proxy captures the extent to which
the bidder and target industries share input from and output to the
same industries.
Local Deal Authors’ calculation Dummy=1 if the bidder and target are located within 30 miles.
The distance is computed using the spherical law of cosines formula:
Distance = arccos(sin(lat1).sin(lat2)+cos(lat1).cos(lat2).cos(long2-
long1)), where R = Radius of the Earth = 3963 miles, (lat1,long1)=
bidder coordinate (latitude,longtitude) in radians, and (lat2,long2)=
target coordinate in radians. Firm location data are from the ZIP
codes in SDC. Coordinates (lat,long) of all the zip codes are from 1987
U.S. Census Gazetteer Files.
Urban Acquirer Authors’ calculation Dummy=1 if a firm is located within 30 miles from one of the ten
largest metropolitan areas (New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago,
Washington DC, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Dallas,
and Houston). Coordinates of the city centers are from www.world-
gazetteer.com. See Local Deal for distance calculation.
Recent SEO SDC Dummy=1 if the bidder issued stock within 18 months prior to the bid.
Recent Acquirer SDC Dummy=1 if the bidder announced a merger bid within 18 months
prior to the sample bid.
Vertical Relatedness Joseph Fan website Based on Fan and Lang (2000), the proxy captures how much in-
put/output of the bidder industry is bought from/sold to the target
industry.
Return Correlation Authors’ calculation Daily stock return correlation between bidder and target; we use [t-290:
t-41] as the estimation window, which covers 250 trading days before
the 40-day run-up period, [t-40:t-1].
Same Primary SIC Dummy SDC Dummy=1 if the bidder primary 4-digit SIC is similar to target primary
4-digit SIC.
Overlapping Industries/Bidder
Industries
SDC Number of overlapping 4-digit SIC Codes between the bidder and tar-
get scaled by the number of bidder 4-digit SIC Codes.
Overlapping Industries/Target
Industries
SDC Number of overlapping 4-digit SIC Codes between the bidder and tar-
get scaled by the number of target 4-digit SIC Codes.
F. Bidder stock price pressure and valuation error
Price pressure Authors’ calculation Following Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), mutual fund price
pressure captures the aggregate price pressure on bidder stocks held
by mutual funds experiencing large fund outflows, scaled by the
stock’s trading volume. The data are from Thomson Reuters mutual
fund holdings database and CRSP mutual fund monthly net returns
database. See section 4 for details.
Valuation Error Authors’ calculation Based on the firm-specific valuation error in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson,
and Viswanathan (2005). Valuation Error = market value - fundamen-
tal value based on the sector pricing rule in year t. The latter is the
fitted firm market value from the regression: market value = β0 + β1
(Book Value of Equity) + β2 (positive component of Net Income) +
β3 (negative component of Net Income) + β4 (Leverage) + e. The βs
are estimated from all Compustat firms in the firm’s Fama-French 16
industries in year t. All variables in the regression, except Leverage,
are in natural log form.
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Table 2
Sample characteristics
The table shows the mean and median values of key characteristics. The sample is 6,200 merger bids for US targets by
US nonfinancial public bidders, 1980-2014. We require deal size ≥10 million, relative deal size ≥1% and nonmissing bidder
characteristics. All variables are defined in Table 1. Columns (4)-(5) and (6)-(7) show the subsamples of all-stock and all-
cash bids, respectively. The p-value in column (9) is the significance of a t-test for the difference in mean between all-stock
and all-cash bids.
Full Sample (N=6,200) All-Stock (N=2,284) All-Cash (N= 2,042) Difference P-value of
N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median in Mean Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Bidder capital structure:
Total Assets (in $ million) 6,200 3,084 350 1,618 189 4,982 726 -3,365 <0.001
Leverage 6,200 0.205 0.162 0.169 0.100 0.217 0.190 -0.049 <0.001
Cash Holding 6,200 0.141 0.078 0.171 0.109 0.112 0.063 0.058 <0.001
M/B 6,200 4.627 2.829 6.390 3.831 3.360 2.525 3.031 <0.001
Dividend Dummy 6,200 0.392 0 0.311 0 0.482 0 -0.172 <0.001
R&D 6,200 0.049 0.007 0.068 0.028 0.034 0.008 0.035 <0.001
Asset Tangibility 6,200 0.417 0.311 0.359 0.267 0.440 0.344 -0.081 <0.001
Operating Efficiency 6,200 2.040 1.496 2.116 1.510 1.966 1.523 0.150 0.381
External pressure to pay in cash:
Competition from Private Buyers 6,200 0.216 0.184 0.160 0.123 0.268 0.250 -0.108 <0.001
Cash-Only Seller 6,200 0.104 0 0.065 0 0.125 0 -0.061 <0.001
Industry HHI 6,053 0.072 0.053 0.076 0.057 0.071 0.054 0.005 0.004
Deal characteristics:
Completed Deal 6,200 0.878 1 0.866 1 0.894 1 -0.028 0.005
Relative Deal Size 6,200 1.007 0.284 1.610 0.405 0.378 0.146 1.232 <0.001
Public Target 6,200 0.455 0 0.436 0 0.520 1 -0.084 <0.001
Industry and time period characteristics:
Industry Wave 6,200 0.539 -0.029 0.797 0.113 0.259 -0.166 0.538 <0.001
Post Bubble 6,200 0.450 0 0.285 0 0.598 1 -0.313 <0.001
High-Tech 6,200 0.433 0 0.545 1 0.356 0 0.189 <0.001
Information asymmetry:
Industry Complementarity 5,960 0.710 0.865 0.726 0.871 0.690 0.800 0.036 <0.001
Local Deal 5,343 0.168 0 0.213 0 0.115 0 0.098 <0.001
Urban Deal 6,071 0.397 0 0.401 0 0.382 0 0.019 0.202
Recent SEO 6,200 0.265 0 0.331 0 0.190 0 0.141 <0.001
Recent Acquirer 6,200 0.251 0 0.311 0 0.212 0 0.100 <0.001
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Table 3
Industry distribution of sample bids and payment method
The table reports the frequency and total dollar volume (in $ thousand) of merger bids in the acquirer’s FF49 industry,
sorted by frequency. Columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) show the percent bids paid in all-stock and all-cash, respectively, while
column (7) reports the average percent stock in mixed bids. The sample contains 6,200 merger bids for US targets by US
nonfinancial public acquirers, 1980-2014.
FF All Mergers % All-Stock Mergers % All-Cash Mergers % Stock in
Code Industry Frequency $ Volume by number by volume by number by volume Mixed Offers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
36 Computer Software 1,151 473,551 49.3 44.7 23.7 27.1 60.4
37 Electronic Equipment 485 202,118 46.8 43.8 27.8 22.9 61.4
34 Business Services 372 95,298 40.6 31.7 25.3 23.2 55.1
30 Petroleum and Natural Gas 357 494,129 27.7 17.1 27.2 11.5 57.3
43 Retail 335 315,109 39.1 9.8 33.1 19.7 54.7
35 Computers 323 264,383 53.6 49.7 27.2 34.6 65.0
32 Communication 317 1,434,986 31.5 32.9 23.3 5.7 59.3
13 Pharmaceutical Products 263 812,888 33.5 38.5 43.0 17.0 62.2
42 Wholesale 234 90,861 36.3 34.9 35.0 25.9 59.2
12 Medical Equipment 218 125,531 39.0 17.2 37.2 26.4 62.2
21 Machinery 201 91,823 33.8 30.6 46.8 34.7 56.8
38 Measuring and Control Equipment 178 95,233 29.2 16.9 43.8 60.4 63.9
11 Healthcare 175 63,035 38.3 16.8 27.4 22.1 53.9
7 Entertainment 104 95,219 35.6 14.3 33.7 64.0 47.0
2 Food Products 100 98,959 23.0 8.6 44.0 50.8 49.5
14 Chemicals 94 104,799 21.3 3.0 40.4 46.1 54.9
22 Electrical Equipment 93 21,939 33.3 23.2 44.1 52.5 33.8
17 Construction Materials 91 22,402 18.7 45.0 47.3 24.4 56.4
19 Steel Works 85 38,544 14.1 6.7 56.5 44.5 48.1
39 Business Supplies 82 82,382 19.5 17.9 47.6 22.9 44.3
9 Consumer Goods 80 91,586 18.8 63.3 53.8 20.6 48.6
44 Restaraunts, Hotels, and Motels 80 13,025 53.8 47.3 26.3 28.2 52.4
41 Transportation 79 31,549 24.1 40.1 32.9 31.9 59.2
33 Personal Services 77 18,899 33.8 28.5 36.4 39.1 70.8
10 Apparel 69 18,805 17.4 8.1 44.9 44.6 34.3
49 Other 68 56,211 32.4 44.5 23.5 40.4 57.6
23 Automobiles and Trucks 62 18,510 12.9 5.3 58.1 65.7 44.5
8 Printing and Publishing 49 17,175 8.2 10.9 71.4 47.2 49.7
18 Construction 48 3,729 25.0 36.4 43.8 40.2 31.2
24 Aircraft 47 51,211 8.5 26.8 66.0 53.4 43.5
15 Rubber and Plastic Products 46 8,555 15.2 29.7 43.5 36.9 58.1
6 Recreation 31 7,401 25.8 61.3 35.5 19.3 57.0
16 Textiles 29 6,142 24.1 24.4 41.4 21.8 61.1
31 Utilities 28 39,949 25.0 4.0 17.9 29.9 52.5
20 Fabricated Products 26 2,805 34.6 14.2 34.6 62.0 39.2
1 Agriculture 22 3,906 40.9 7.4 31.8 50.0 58.9
27 Precious Metals 19 5,184 52.6 58.2 21.1 10.9 76.0
4 Beer and Liquor 15 24,485 6.7 0.0 26.7 5.3 51.4
28 Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 13 58,990 30.8 11.8 15.4 1.8 47.8
3 Candy and Soda 12 4,503 0.0 0.0 33.3 44.4 39.0
26 Defense 11 11,797 27.3 76.6 54.5 19.2 46.2
40 Shipping Containers 11 8,125 18.2 1.5 36.4 30.1 51.3
25 Shipbuilding and Railroad Equipment 8 3,884 0.0 0.0 50.0 27.3 71.1
29 Coal 8 5,101 25.0 10.5 50.0 73.9 46.9
5 Tobacco Products 4 28,592 0.0 0.0 50.0 11.3 26.6
Total 6,200 5,563,305 36.8 30.3 32.9 20.8 57.3
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Table 4
Baseline tobit model for the fraction of stock in takeover bids
The table reports the coefficient estimates from tobit regressions for the fraction of stock (vs. cash) in the deal payment.
The sample is split into High-Tech and Non-Tech bidders in columns (6) and (7), respectively. The explanatory variables
are controls for bidder capital structure and external pressure to pay in cash, as well as deal, industry and time period
characteristics. Firm-level variables are lagged by one year. All variables are defined in Table 1. Industry dummies indicate
the bidder’s FF49 industry. A constant term is included but not reported. The sample contains 6,200 merger bids for US
targets by US nonfinancial public acquirers, 1980-2014. t-statistics are in parenthesis, using robust standard errors. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Sample: All firms High-Tech Non-Tech
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Bidder capital structure:
Size -0.17 -0.173 -0.1 -0.168 -0.085 -0.117 -0.087
(12.83)*** (12.74)*** (7.34)*** (12.39)*** (6.15)*** (5.70)*** (4.66)***
Leverage -0.054 -0.1 -0.051 -0.076 0.033 0.081 -0.055
(0.48) (0.86) (0.45) (0.66) (0.30) (0.46) (0.38)
Cash Holding -0.063 -0.235 0.085 -0.216 0.051 -0.123 0.452
(0.40) (1.49) (0.55) (1.37) (0.33) (0.61) (1.84)*
M/B 0.03 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.018 0.03 0.011
(8.03)*** (6.82)*** (6.79)*** (6.65)*** (5.06)*** (6.12)*** (2.02)**
Dividend Dummy -0.116 0.015 -0.057 0.02 -0.064 -0.063 -0.038
(2.38)** (0.29) (1.17) (0.41) (1.34) (0.77) (0.61)
R&D 1.823 2.19 2.127 2.056 2.016 1.958 3.733
(5.91)*** (6.40)*** (6.31)*** (5.96)*** (6.13)*** (5.12)*** (4.44)***
Asset Tangibility -0.089 -0.286 -0.293 -0.291 -0.295 -0.306 -0.29
(1.34) (3.64)*** (3.83)*** (3.71)*** (3.95)*** (2.15)** (3.18)***
Operating Efficiency 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.007 -0.004
(0.90) (0.72) (1.04) (0.71) (0.84) (1.30) (0.64)
External pressure to pay in cash:
Competition from Private Buyers -2.209 -2.281 -1.609 -2.223 -0.938 -2.184 -1.261
(15.14)*** (15.39)*** (11.03)*** (15.05)*** (6.05)*** (7.80)*** (7.52)***
Cash-only sellers -0.388 -0.333 -0.305 -0.33 -0.275 -0.454 -0.228
(5.03)*** (4.38)*** (4.10)*** (4.35)*** (3.81)*** (3.64)*** (2.49)**
Deal characteristics:
Large Relative Deal Size 0.452 0.437 0.500 0.438 0.526 0.488 0.487
(8.25)*** (8.03)*** (9.36)*** (8.07)*** (9.99)*** (5.74)*** (7.15)***
Public Target 0.008 0.027 -0.034 0.023 -0.048 -0.098 0.043
(0.16) (0.55) (0.69) (0.47) (0.99) (1.31) (0.67)
Industry and time period characteristics:
Industry Wave 0.115 0.103 0.096 0.082 0.008 0.130 0.063
(7.05)*** (6.36)*** (6.13)*** (4.85)*** (0.41) (5.45)*** (2.98)***
Post Bubble -0.738 -0.99 -0.563
(14.69)*** (12.00)*** (8.58)***
Credit Spread -0.074
(3.99)***
High-Tech Dummy 0.298 0.248 0.277
(4.18)*** (3.41)*** (3.98)***
Year Dummies No No No No Yes No No
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.11
N 5,841 5,841 5,841 5,841 5,841 2,601 3,240
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Table 5
Baseline multinomial model for the all-stock, mixed, and all-cash payment choice
The table reports the coefficient estimates from multinomial probit regressions for the choice of payment method in takeover
bids. The outcomes are all-stock (odd-numbered columns), mixed (even-numbered columns), and all-cash (base outcome)
offers. The explanatory variables are controls for bidder capital structure and external pressure to pay in cash, as well as
deal, industry and time period characteristics. All variables are defined in Table 1. Firm-level variables are lagged by one
year. Industry dummies indicate the bidder’s FF49 industry. A constant term is included but not reported. The sample
contains 6,200 merger bids for US targets by US nonfinancial public acquirers, 1980-2014. Z-statistics are in parenthesis,
using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Model: I II III
Outcome: All-Stock Mixed All-Stock Mixed All-Stock Mixed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bidder capital structure:
Size -0.215 -0.117 -0.227 -0.131 -0.143 -0.108
(13.70)*** (7.60)*** (13.67)*** (8.05)*** (8.06)*** (6.29)***
Leverage -0.019 0.567 -0.09 0.373 -0.067 0.355
(0.13) (3.98)*** (0.57) (2.54)** (0.41) (2.43)**
Cash Holding -0.061 0.301 -0.294 0.073 0.147 0.188
(0.31) (1.52) (1.47) (0.36) (0.72) (0.90)
M/B 0.034 0.001 0.029 -0.001 0.028 -0.002
(6.15)*** (0.25) (5.26)*** (0.15) (5.27)*** (0.36)
Dividend Dummy -0.087 -0.042 0.08 0.028 -0.025 -0.01
(1.48) (0.72) (1.28) (0.45) (0.39) (0.16)
R&D 2.553 1.265 3.38 2.49 3.176 2.206
(6.12)*** (2.93)*** (6.43)*** (4.65)*** (6.21)*** (4.23)***
Asset Tangibility -0.086 0.273 -0.31 -0.046 -0.338 -0.064
(0.98) (3.30)*** (2.87)*** (0.45) (3.08)*** (0.63)
Operating Efficiency 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005
(1.16) (0.98) (0.99) (0.99) (1.19) (1.10)
External pressure to pay in cash:
Competition from Private Buyers -2.545 -0.741 -2.747 -0.776 -2.001 -0.695
(14.30)*** (4.68)*** (14.68)*** (4.71)*** (10.52)*** (4.08)***
Cash-Only Seller -0.454 -0.155 -0.405 -0.111 -0.377 -0.099
(4.74)*** (1.79)* (4.11)*** (1.25) (3.78)*** (1.12)
Deal characteristics:
Large Relative Deal Size 0.633 0.813 0.638 0.779 0.73 0.801
(9.30)*** (11.78)*** (9.16)*** (11.06)*** (10.10)*** (11.21)***
Public Target -0.064 -0.357 -0.036 -0.332 -0.094 -0.352
(1.05) (5.95)*** (0.59) (5.42)*** (1.50) (5.74)***
Industry and time period characteristics:
Industry Wave 0.147 0.119 0.136 0.111 0.138 0.101
(6.98)*** (5.60)*** (6.33)*** (5.16)*** (6.58)*** (4.88)***
Post Bubble -0.968 -0.184
(15.23)*** (3.08)***
High-Tech Dummy 0.388 0.138
(4.13)*** (1.54)
Industry Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood -6,028 -5,862 -5,717
N 6,200 6,200 6,200
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Table 6
Baseline tobit model for the fraction of stock with leverage and cash decomposition
The table reports the coefficient estimates from tobit regressions for the fraction of stock (vs. cash) in the deal payment.
Market and book leverage are decomposed into Target Leverage and Deviation from Target Leverage, based on Harford,
Klasa, and Walcott (2009). Cash Holding is decomposed into Target Cash Holding and Deviation from Target Cash. See
Table 1 for variable definitions. The remaining explanatory variables are controls for bidder capital structure and external
pressure to pay in cash, as well as deal, industry and time period characteristics from Table 4. Firm-level variables are
lagged by one year. Industry dummies indicate the bidder’s FF49 industry. A constant term is included but not reported.
The sample contains 6,200 merger bids for US targets by US nonfinancial public acquirers, 1980-2014. t-statistics are in
parenthesis, using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
Market leverage Book leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bidder capital structure:
Deviation from Target Leverage 0.842 1.554 0.806 0.203 0.503 0.048
(2.96)*** (5.46)*** (2.81)*** (0.89) (2.19)** (0.21)
Deviation from Target Cash -0.02 -0.036 -0.075 -0.143 -0.177 -0.197
(0.10) (0.18) (0.39) (0.69) (0.87) (0.98)
Target Leverage -0.563 -1.135 -0.421 -0.11 -0.398 0.001
(2.95)*** (5.76)*** (2.08)** (0.71) (2.46)** (0.01)
Target Cash Holding -4.234 -7.675 -3.34 -3.585 -6.575 -1.983
(7.72)*** (11.51)*** (4.41)*** (6.88)*** (10.05)*** (2.67)***
Size -0.19 -0.218 -0.132 -0.205 -0.241 -0.137
(12.94)*** (14.29)*** (8.02)*** (13.71)*** (15.04)*** (7.85)***
M/B 0.032 0.026 0.025 0.033 0.028 0.025
(7.30)*** (6.05)*** (5.93)*** (7.41)*** (6.35)*** (5.95)***
Dividend Dummy -0.218 -0.08 -0.105 -0.209 -0.073 -0.103
(3.95)*** (1.45) (1.93)* (3.69)*** (1.28) (1.83)*
R&D 3.268 4.242 3.154 3.231 4.288 2.977
(8.36)*** (10.23)*** (7.66)*** (7.92)*** (9.87)*** (6.91)***
Asset Tangibility -0.248 -0.7 -0.483 -0.236 -0.692 -0.454
(3.23)*** (7.63)*** (5.26)*** (2.95)*** (7.23)*** (4.77)***
Operating Efficiency 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.93) (0.83) (1.02) (0.78) (0.57) (0.86)
External pressure to pay in cash:
Competition from Private Buyers -2.2 -2.113 -1.674 -2.305 -2.257 -1.743
(13.85)*** (13.24)*** (10.53)*** (14.20)*** (13.77)*** (10.70)***
Cash Only Sellers -0.39 -0.318 -0.307 -0.435 -0.365 -0.351
(4.63)*** (3.87)*** (3.78)*** (5.03)*** (4.32)*** (4.21)***
Deal characteristics:
Large Relative Deal Size 0.529 0.537 0.576 0.553 0.556 0.596
(8.77)*** (9.04)*** (9.79)*** (8.78)*** (8.97)*** (9.71)***
Public Target -0.012 -0.02 -0.05 -0.065 -0.071 -0.095
(0.23) (0.38) (0.94) (1.17) (1.30) (1.78)*
Industry and time period characteristics:
Industry Wave 0.115 0.096 0.088 0.123 0.108 0.095
(6.33)*** (5.38)*** (5.05)*** (6.65)*** (5.91)*** (5.32)***
Post Bubble -0.646 -0.721
(10.28)*** (11.21)***
High-Tech Dummy 0.302 0.293
(3.89)*** (3.66)***
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.14
N 5,070 5,070 5,070 5,316 5,316 5,316
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Table 7
Regressions for information asymmetry and payment method choice
The table reports the coefficient estimates from tobit regressions for the fraction of stock in takeover bids (columns (1)-(2))
and multinomial probit regressions for the choice of payment method, where the outcomes are all-stock, mixed, and all-cash
(baseline) bids (columns (3)-(6)). The explanatory variables are measures for information asymmetry about bidder valuation
based on bidder and target industry complementary (Industry Complementarity), geography (Local Deal, Urban Deal),
and recent transactions (Recent CEO, Recent Acquirer), as well as measures for external pressures to pay in cash. All
variables are defined in Table 1. The regressions also include controls for bidder capital structure, deal, industry, and time
period characteristics from Table 4. Firm-level variables are lagged by one year. A constant term is included but not
reported. The sample contains 6,200 merger bids for US targets by US nonfinancial public acquirers, 1980-2014. Columns
(1)-(2) show t-statistics in parenthesis, while columns (3)-(6) show Z-statistics, all using robust standard errors. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Regression model Tobit Multinomial probit
I II
All-Stock Mixed All-Stock Mixed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Information asymmetry:
Industry Complementarity 0.31 0.231 0.302 0.226 0.235 0.2
(3.88)*** (3.27)*** (3.63)*** (2.68)*** (2.52)** (2.23)**
Local Deal 0.595 0.459 0.617 0.392 0.595 0.361
(8.44)*** (7.33)*** (8.34)*** (5.17)*** (7.17)*** (4.44)***
Urban Deal -0.004 0.007 0.008 0.075 0.054 0.115
(0.08) (0.15) (0.15) (1.35) (0.87) (1.92)*
Recent SEO 0.583 0.273 0.624 0.375 0.3 0.189
(9.50)*** (4.94)*** (9.81)*** (5.72)*** (4.07)*** (2.62)***
Recent Acquirer 0.46 0.298 0.454 0.044 0.368 0.189
(7.64)*** (5.35)*** (7.31)*** (0.67) (5.14)*** (2.63)***
External pressure to pay in cash:
Competition from Private Buyers -1.432 -1.839 -0.609
(9.36)*** (8.91)*** (3.34)***
Cash-only seller -0.371 -0.511 -0.111
(4.40)*** (4.39)*** (1.12)
Industry HHI 1.604 -0.63 1.651 -0.172 -0.793 -1.225
(3.86)*** (1.52) (3.98)*** (0.37) (1.49) (2.25)**
Bidder capital structure No Yes No No Yes Yes
Deal characteristics No Yes No No Yes Yes
Industry and time-period No Yes No No Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared/Log Likelihood 0.02 0.14 -5,482 -4,651
N 4,872 4,764 5,128 5,014
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Table 8
Alternative measures for information asymmetry and payment method choice
The table reports the coefficient estimates from tobit regressions for the fraction of stock in takeover bids (columns (1)-(5))
and multinomial probit regressions for the choice of payment method, where the outcomes are all-stock, mixed, and all-cash
(baseline) bids (columns (6)-(7)). The explanatory variables are measures for information asymmetry about bidder valuation
based on bidder and target industry relatedness (Vertical Relatedness, Acquirer-Target Return Correlation, Same Primary
SIC Dummy, Overlapping Industries/Acquirer Industries, andOverlapping Industries/Target Industries). All variables are
defined in Table 1. The regressions also control for the information asymmetry measures from Table 7 as well as measures
for external pressures to pay in cash, bidder capital structure, deal, industry, and time period characteristics from Table
4. Firm-level variables are lagged by one year. A constant term is included but not reported. The sample contains 6,200
merger bids for US targets by US nonfinancial public acquirers, 1980-2014. Columns (1)-(5) show t-statistics in parenthesis,
while columns (6)-(7) show Z-statistics, all using robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Regression model Tobit Multinomial probit
All-Stock Mixed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Information asymmetry:
Vertical Relateness 1.058 1.272 1.648
(2.78)*** (2.40)** (3.30)***
Same Primary SIC Dummy 0.152
(3.13)***
Overlapping Industries/Acquirer Industries 0.174
(2.40)**
Overlapping Industries/Target Industries 0.131
(2.26)**
Acquirer-Target Return Correlation 1.595
(6.09)***
Local Deal 0.46 0.455 0.454 0.456 0.533 0.592 0.357
(7.33)*** (7.25)*** (7.22)*** (7.26)*** (4.50)*** (7.15)*** (4.39)***
Urban Deal 0.006 0.012 0.009 0.008 -0.064 0.053 0.113
(0.12) (0.25) (0.20) (0.18) (0.73) (0.85) (1.87)*
Recent SEO 0.27 0.267 0.263 0.271 0.469 0.296 0.18
(4.89)*** (4.85)*** (4.76)*** (4.90)*** (4.34)*** (4.02)*** (2.49)**
Recent Acquirer 0.282 0.281 0.284 0.282 0.383 0.354 0.202
(5.06)*** (5.05)*** (5.09)*** (5.07)*** (3.78)*** (4.96)*** (2.80)***
External pressure to pay in cash:
Competition from Private Buyers -1.417 -1.437 -1.46 -1.448 -1.725 -1.826 -0.57
(9.22)*** (9.39)*** (9.54)*** (9.45)*** (6.13)*** (8.82)*** (3.09)***
Cash-only seller -0.373 -0.371 -0.374 -0.372 0.294 -0.514 -0.109
(4.42)*** (38.03)*** (38.03)*** (38.03)*** (0.73) (4.42)*** (1.10)
Industry HHI -0.634 -0.606 -0.627 -0.651 -1.281 -0.778 -1.188
(1.53) (1.46) (1.51) (1.57) (1.51) (1.47) (2.18)**
Other controls:
Bidder capital structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and time-period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared/Log Likelihood 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 -4,650
N 4,764 4,764 4,764 4,764 2,078 5,014
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Table 9
Instrumentation of acquirer misvaluation using mutual fund outflows
The table reports coefficient estimates from instrumental variable (IV) regressions for acquirer misvaluation, measured by
M/B (models I and II) and firm-specific valuation error (models III and IV). The even columns show the second-stage IV
tobit regressions for the percent stock payment. The explanatory variables are Price pressure (bidder stock price pressure
from mutual fund outflows) and instrumented misvaluation from the first-stage estimation. The regressions control for the
baseline model (column 3 of Table 4). All variables are defined in Table 1. The regressions are estimated using maximum
likelihood. Firm-level variables are lagged by one year. Industry dummies, which are included in models II and IV, indicate
the bidder’s FF49 industry. A constant term is included but not reported. The sample contains 6,200 merger bids for US
targets by US nonfinancial public acquirers, 1980-2014. t-statistics are in parenthesis, using robust standard errors. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Model I II III IV
Dependent Variable: M/B Percent M/B Percent Valuation Percent Valuation Percent
Stock Stock Error Stock Error Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Instrumentation of Misvaluation:
Instrumented M/B 0.164 0.154
(0.49) (0.48)
Instrumented Valuation Error 0.327 0.33
(0.80) (0.23)
Price pressure -5.77 -5.897 -6.959 -6.02
(2.52)*** (2.56)*** (5.28)*** (4.59)***
External pressure to pay in cash:
Competition from Private Buyers -0.51 -1.459 -0.507 -1.543 -0.104 -1.55 -0.152 -1.599
(2.95)*** (6.38)*** (2.86)*** (6.82)*** (1.58) (9.98)*** (2.28)** (6.52)***
Cash-Only Seller -0.253 -0.433 -0.215 -0.368 -0.182 -0.367 -0.158 -0.321
(2.67)*** (3.62)*** (2.27)** (3.40)*** (5.04)*** (3.36)*** (4.43)*** (1.34)
Other controls:
Bidder capital structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and time-period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Exogeneity tests :
Wald Statistic 4.27 3.61 15.59 10.96
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak Instrument tests :
F Statistic 6.33 6.56 27.8 20.79
p-value 0.0119 0.0105 0 0
N 5,097 5,097 5,377 5,377
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Table 10
Determinants of acquirer announcement CAR
The table reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions for the acquirer three-day announcement return. The explana-
tory variables are Fraction Stock, M/B, and a Public Target dummy, as well as controls for external pressure to pay in cash,
bidder capital structure, and deal, industry and time period characteristics from Table 4. All variables are defined in Table
1. Firm characteristics are lagged by one year. Industry dummies indicate the bidder’s FF49 industry. The sample contains
6,200 merger bids for US targets by US public bidders, 1980-2014. The t-statistics are in parentheses, using robust standard
errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payment method and bidder valuation measures:
Fraction Stock -0.02 -0.02 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008
(3.75)*** (3.90)*** (1.39) (1.52) (1.03) (1.14)
M/B x Fraction Stock 0 0 0 0
(0.68) (0.66) (0.48) (0.48)
M/B 0 0 0 0
(0.98) (1.04) (0.97) (1.04)
Payment method and deal characteristics:
Public Target x Fraction Stock -0.056 -0.055 -0.056 -0.055
(7.88)*** (7.82)*** (7.81)*** (7.77)***
Public Target -0.037 -0.037 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007
(9.84)*** (10.11)*** (1.20) (1.34) (1.22) (1.37)
Large Relative Deal Size 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.67)* (1.57) (1.73)* (1.63) (1.76)* (1.67)*
External pressure to pay in cash:
Competition from Private Buyers 0 -0.004 0 -0.002 0 -0.003
(0.03) (0.24) (0.01) (0.15) (0.03) (0.18)
Cash Only Sellers 0.005 0.005 0.01 0.009 0.01 0.009
(0.62) (0.54) (1.13) (1.03) (1.10) (1.00)
Other controls
Bidder capital structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and time-period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
N 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396 5,396
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Table 11
Acquirer long-run (36 months) returns by payment method and M/B
The table reports the coefficient estimates from calendar time portfolio regressions. The dependent variable is the monthly
return on portfolios of acquirers sorted by payment method (All-Stock versus All-Cash) and above versus below median
M/B. Columns (3) and (6) contain portfolios that are long all-cash acquirers and short all-stock acquirers. An acquirer
enters the portfolio in the month following a bid announcement and is held for 36 months or until delisting, whichever comes
first. The explanatory variables are the Fama and French (1993) three factors (Rm, SMB, and HML) and the Carhart (1997)
momentum (UMD). Rm is the excess return on the market. The monthly returns on bidder portfolios are equal-weighted
in Panel A and value-weighted in panel B. The sample contains 6,200 merger bids for US targets by US public bidders,
1980-2014. t-statistics are in parentheses and standard errors are robust. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Acquirer valuation: High M/B Low M/B
Payment method: All All Long Cash All All Long Cash
Stock Cash Short Stock Stock Cash Short Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Equal-weighted returns
α -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.003
(1.81)* (1.66)* (0.27) (0.62) (1.40) (1.48)
Risk Factors:
rem 1.209 1.035 -0.15 1.111 0.986 -0.125
(26.56)*** (23.98)*** (2.62)*** (27.21)*** (33.89)*** (2.79)***
SMB 0.745 0.559 -0.213 0.934 0.626 -0.308
(11.60)*** (9.14)*** (2.62)*** (16.03)*** (15.07)*** (4.82)***
HML -0.629 -0.138 0.457 -0.222 0.377 0.6
(9.10)*** (2.10)** (5.24)*** (3.57)*** (8.51)*** (8.80)***
UMD -0.336 -0.285 0.09 -0.414 -0.206 0.208
(7.92)*** (6.98)*** (1.67)* (10.83)*** (7.54)*** (4.95)***
R-squared 0.8 0.73 0.16 0.81 0.81 0.33
N (months) 411 405 405 419 418 418
B: Value-weighted returns
α -0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0 0.001
(1.36) (0.47) (1.52) (0.68) (0.20) (0.65)
Risk Factors:
rem 1.091 0.984 -0.102 1.064 0.989 -0.075
(25.28)*** (27.38)*** (2.04)** (28.08)*** (30.35)*** (1.61)
SMB -0.098 -0.117 -0.035 0.19 0.059 -0.129
(1.61) (2.29)** (0.50) (3.52)*** (1.27) (1.93)*
HML -0.665 -0.405 0.239 -0.241 0.208 0.449
(10.13)*** (7.40)*** (3.15)*** (4.17)*** (4.20)*** (6.30)***
UMD -0.038 -0.115 -0.059 -0.087 -0.078 0.004
(0.94) (3.39)*** (1.25) (2.44)** (2.56)** (0.10)
R-squared 0.73 0.74 0.06 0.74 0.72 0.16
N (months) 411 405 405 419 418 418
47
about ECGI
The European Corporate Governance Institute has been established to improve corpo-
rate governance through fostering independent scientific research and related activities.
The ECGI produces and disseminates high quality research while remaining close to the 
concerns and interests of corporate, financial and public policy makers. It draws on the 
expertise of scholars from numerous countries and bring together a critical mass of exper-
tise and interest to bear on this important subject.
The views expressed in this working paper are those of the authors, not those of the ECGI 
or its members. 
www.ecgi.org
ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance
Editorial Board
Editor  Ernst Maug, Professor of Corporate Finance, University of 
 Mannheim, ECGI
Consulting Editors Franklin Allen, Nippon Life Professor of Finance and  
 Economics, The Wharton School, University of   
 Pennsylvania, ECGI
 Julian Franks, Professor of Finance, London Business School,  
 ECGI and CEPR
 Marco Pagano, Professor of Economics, Università di Napoli  
 Federico II, ECGI and CEPR
  Xavier Vives, Professor of Economics and Financial   
 Management, IESE Business School, University of Navarra,  
 ECGI and CEPR
 Luigi Zingales, Robert C. McCormack Professor of   
 Entrepreneurship and Finance, University of Chicago, Booth  
 School of Business, ECGI and CEPR
Editorial Assistants : Pascal Busch, University of Mannheim 
 Marcel Mager, University of Mannheim
 Florian Protschky, University of Mannheim
   
 
www.ecgi.org\wp
Electronic Access to the Working Paper Series
The full set of ECGI working papers can be accessed through the Institute’s Web-site 
(www.ecgi.org/wp) or SSRN:
Finance Paper Series  http://www.ssrn.com/link/ECGI-Finance.html 
Law Paper Series  http://www.ssrn.com/link/ECGI-Law.html 
www.ecgi.org\wp
